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ABSTRACT 
 
This chapter focuses on children’s rights to religious freedom raised against state policies in 
state schools. It analyses the distinction usually drawn between religious education (RE) 
courses and others. Most legal systems will allow non-denominational RE courses in state 
schools provided they are accompanied with rights to opt-out. By contrast, purely “secular” 
courses will usually be mandatory. I will argue that, assuming that rights to opt out legitimately 
accompany RE courses, they should also attach to secular courses on ethics and morality. On 
the contrary, religious and moral implications of scientific theories, such as evolutionary 
theories, should not I will argue give rise to exemption rights. In a second part, the chapter 
considers religious symbol cases. I will argue that whether symbols are state endorsed or worn 
by pupils, courts should resist the temptation to ascribe unilateral meanings to symbols but 
carry out instead a contextual assessment of their impact. 
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Religious freedom – the right to hold, manifest and change one’s religious beliefs- is a 
cornerstone of democracy, proclaimed and protected in many international provisions.i It has 
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been described as the “First Freedom” (McConnell 2000) and as “self-evidently good” (Finnis 
1980: 85-86) but is also the most embattled of freedoms – one which has been fiercely opposed 
on grounds of neutrality, social cohesion, and rights of subordinated persons in religious 
communities to autonomy and equality.ii Controversies over the meaning and scope of state 
neutrality, personal autonomy and the extent to which feelings of alienation/identity are to bear 
on legal outcomes underlie issues relating to religious freedom, making any solutions more 
complex to find. The complexity increases when religious freedom claims are raised in a school 
context. Nowhere has state neutrality, democracy, autonomy, and identity been discussed more 
vehemently than in the field of education. State schools emblematically represent the chosen 
national model of Church/State relationships and often raise difficult constitutional issues of 
permissible state entanglement with religion (Hunter-Henin 2011). Moreover, at the interaction 
of religion and education lies a nexus of potentially conflicting rights such as rights of parents 
to ensure that their children are educated in accordance with their convictions and rights of 
children to develop their own beliefs, as well as interests of the State in fostering social 
cohesion and in forming good citizens (Adhar & Leigh: 243).  
This chapter focuses on children’s rights to religious freedom, raised against state 
policies in state schools, from a mainly UK (and specifically English) Law perspective, but 
with references to US and European case-law – from other European jurisdictions (especially 
France) as well as from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). I 
will leave aside the issue of possible clashes between parents’ and children’s rights to religious 
freedoms (Dwyer). Such clashes are more prominent in cases where parents wish to opt their 
children out of state school education in favour of private religious schools,iii argue over the 
type of (religious) education to be given to their childreniv or wish their children to leave the 
school system altogether.v In state schools, parents’ claims made on behalf of their children are 
assumed to match their children’s views.vi Such a presumption could naturally be contested but 
I will leave this aspect aside and concentrate instead on the balancing exercise between the 
children’s/parents’ religious freedom claim and competing state interests. Whilst such 
balancing is common in all religious freedom claims, the fact that in a state school context 
children are involved has (and in my view should have) a bearing. Children’s religious freedom 
claims in a school context present the particularity of potentially affecting children’s right to 
education.vii 
Religion will mainly feature in state schools within the syllabus or through symbols. 
Whilst the presence of religious symbols tends to be dealt with relatively straightforwardly 
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under the relevant general constitutional principles, religious requests aimed at the syllabus 
will often involve potentially more problematic derogations and exemptions. After addressing 
in a first part the preliminary question as to whether children should be exposed to religion at 
all in state schools, I examine in a second part instances of children objecting to teaching 
endorsed by their school on the basis that it conflicts with their own religious convictions, “the 
exemption course cases.” In a third and final part, I analyse instances of children wishing to 
express their religious views by wearing symbols or clothing in a way that departs from school 
uniform or other policies: “the religious symbol cases.” Currently exemption course cases are 
split between courses on religion (RE courses) (from which dispensation is allowed, indeed 
required) and others. I will argue that a more convincing dividing line would be between 
courses on ethics, religion and morality and others. As for religious symbol cases, they tend, in 
practice, to be more easily accommodated by schools but children’s requests will often be 
turned down by courts when they clash with social cohesion interests. I will argue in favour of 
a more nuanced approach and warn against abstract assumptions about the meaning of religious 
symbols.  
 
PART I  THE PRESENCE OF RELIGION IN STATE SCHOOLS 
Should religion feature at all in state schools? Children’s religious exercise –like adults’–
enhances their autonomy as well as their sense of identity and belonging. The wearing of 
religious garments for example is a way for children to assert and test their sense of identity 
and group membership. However, justifications based on autonomy and identity are more open 
to challenge in relation to children than in respect of adults (Quennerstedt). On one reading, 
concerns for the welfare of children, the risk of pressures exercised upon them, could support 
minimizing their exposure to religion. The risk of indoctrination of children, both by the State 
and the children’s communities of origin and families, would call – the argument goes–  for 
liberal state education to steer away from religion altogether. Yet the unavoidable inculcation 
of values through education immediately raises questions as to the neutrality of a “neutral” 
non-religious education (Gutmann 1999 and 2002; McConnell 2002), just as the religious 
values imbued into secular majority norms raise questions as to the “a-religious” nature of such 
a neutral education (Ferrari). In the US context, the courts have thus declared: “the First 
Amendment was never intended to insulate our public institutions from any mention of God, 
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the Bible or religion. When such insulation occurs, another religion, such as secular humanism, 
is effectively established.”viii  
In most States, constitutional restrictions on religious manifestations in state schools 
will thus not apply to pupils but only to the State and, sometimes, by extension, to school staff 
employed by the State. Whereas school teachers can arguably see their religious autonomy 
curtailed to preserve state neutralityix and avoid any indoctrination effect on pupils,x children 
are normally free – in principle– to express their religious beliefs at school. One notable 
exception is France where pupils have, under the 2004 Law,xi been forbidden to wear 
ostentatious religious symbols on state school premises. The 2004 French Law relies on 
constitutional Church/State arrangements, under an extensive and closed conception of the 
principle of secularism, known in France as “laïcité” (Willaime). Undoubtedly, the French 
position is inherently hostile to religion, especially as a far more tolerant approach to religion 
in state schools would also have been compatible with laïcité, even in a French context.xii The 
2004 stance strongly encourages pupils to think of themselves as a-religious beings with 
religion relegated to extracurricular activities, just like any other hobby. Until recently 
however,xiii such restrictive view of religion was less a reflection of the role of religion in the 
public sphere as a whole than a consequence of the special nature of the state school context. 
The school, emanation of the State (Rollin), treats children as citizens.xiv This initial specificity 
of schools corresponds to the French conception of education. The French portray the school 
as a place of intellectual endeavours, detached from outside influences. Its essence is not to be 
a microcosm of the world but an intellectual haven, away from the world’s tensions and 
problems (Williams). The naked sphere created by the 2004 law resonates with this abstract 
view of education and could therefore be, from a children’s right perspective, defended as 
enhancing children’s education.  
Despite blatantly denying the rights of religious pupils to express their religious faith 
at school, the 2004 law also arguably relies on grounds of autonomy. First– the argument goes– 
the law would allow pupils to weigh different viewpoints and make a more informed and 
autonomous choice about their religious beliefs in due course. Secondly, following reports of 
pressures on some young Muslim girls to wear the Islamic scarf, the 2004 Law allegedly had 
an emancipatory effect (Weil). However, arguments based on autonomy do not offer a reliable 
justification for the law. Evidence of coerced consent would need to be available in each 
individual case. Restriction of a fundamental right should only be justified in light of actual not 
potential coercion.xv Moreover the 2004 Law suggests that critical thinking can only occur 
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outside of religious influences,xvi a suggestion likely to be alienating for religious pupils. From 
a children rights’ perspective, the French 2004 law can therefore be criticised as abstract 
notions of education and freedom are in effect allowed to trump actual concrete rights of 
schoolchildren to an inclusive education and to religious expression. By contrast, most other 
legal systems will usually respect children’s requests to manifest their religion at school. As 
children develop their own sense of identity, a school environment in which children can feel 
free and safe to express their emerging beliefs and practice religion would seem more in-fitting 
with a tolerant and supportive education. But to what extent exactly should children’s claims 
to religious freedoms be accommodated? The question remains as to whether state restriction 
upon individual religious freedom ought to be applied more strictly to state school children 
than to adults. Critics have warned that greater resistance to religious expression in state 
schools may only signal undue suspicions towards religion and an undue patronising treatment 
of children.  
 
PART II  CHILDREN’S EXEMPTION RIGHTS FROM COURSES 
 
Presence of religion; absence of the child from courses on religion 
Where a school provides religious education classes or acts of worship, pupils may wish to be 
exempt from attending. Most legal systems have granted pupils (or pupils’ parents) a right to 
opt-out in these instances. Unlike the French, the US constitutional model of secularism does 
not preclude teaching about religion in state schools,xvii as long as such teaching pursues a 
secular purposexviii and does not endorsexix religion. Teaching about religion in US public 
schools would therefore be compatible with the non-establishment clause under the First 
Amendment (Greenawalt 2009). On the other hand, religious instruction or religious activities 
such as Bible readingsxx or prayersxxi will not be permitted. Whereas, in England,xxii state 
schools will provide Religious Education (RE) classes and are also meant to organise a daily 
act of worship (Cumper 1998), religious activities may not be held in US public schools unless 
they are organised unofficially (Underwood).  When public schools do provide courses on 
religion, the US Supreme Court as well as the ECtHR require that they be taught objectively, 
failing which the course would amount to state indoctrination of children (Leigh). Yet an 
objectively taught course on RE might still be held to be unconstitutional or contrary to the 
European Convention if it is mandatory.  If the contested course is not religious in nature or 
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purpose, one might wonder why its mandatory nature would violate pupils’ freedom of 
conscience.xxiii  
Similarly, the ECtHR in Folgerø v Norwayxxiv was adamant (albeit by a narrow margin of 9 to 
8) that full rights to opt out had to attach to RE courses, at least when the religious education 
syllabi contained quantitative imbalances between religions. In compliance with these 
requirements, parents may, in England and Wales, ask to have their children withdrawn from 
RExxv or collective worshipxxvi and pupils themselves, once they reach the sixth-form, that is 
the final two years of schooling, may exercise the right to opt out independently.xxvii Rights to 
opt out may seem particularly necessary in England since the daily act of worship is to be 
mainly of a Christian character.xxviii Predominance of the majority religion might indeed be 
accused of alienating pupils of minority religious faith but it seems that, however balanced, 
courses or activities on religion, just as in the US, will never be neutral enough to justify the 
abolition of rights to opt out under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) 
framework. It is then the presumed inherent lack of neutrality of courses on religion which 
justifies rights to opt out.  By contrast, derogation requests from “purely secular” courses will 
be less successful. 
 
Religious pupils and courses other than RE courses 
Unlike for RE courses, mandating certain other courses for all students is consistent with ECHR 
requirements. The ECtHR has held that absence of an opt out from mandatory ethics,xxix sex 
educationxxx or mixed swimming coursesxxxi did not violate children’s rights to religious 
freedoms (under article 9 ECHR) or their parents’ rights (under article 9 ECHR and article 2 
Protocol 1). This difference of treatment between RE courses and others might seem 
paradoxical. Courses on religion are arguably more essential than many other courses (Cumper 
2011). Ignorance about religion would be a serious impediment to proper understanding of 
history, art and literature. From a pastoral care perspective, courses on religion support pupils’ 
on-going process of self-definition (Miedema). Socially, they enhance citizens’ tolerance and 
improve inter-faith relationships (Jackson). Consequently, many have argued that state school 
children would benefit from more classes about religion (Greenawalt 2005; Wexler 2002).  
Clearly, then, rights to be exempt from courses on religion cannot be explained in terms 
of their being less important. Rather, exemptions rest on pupils’ (and parents’) rights to 
freedom of conscience.  RE courses might be seen to undermine religious faith, relegating it to 
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one option amongst many. Conversely, they might be perceived as giving too much importance 
to religion; some pupils and parents – whether religious or atheist– might believe attending RE 
courses infringes their freedom of conscience. Such concern for pupils’ and parents’ religious 
sensitivities has sparked controversies. For some, the social goal of forming citizens should 
receive priority over concerns for individual religious convictions (Macedo). For others, 
accommodation of children’s religious convictions at school would on the contrary be 
necessary to protect minority rights (Kylimcka) and promote multicultural inclusion in 
education (Connell).  
My aim here is not to repeat this important debate on democracy and religion but to 
point to possible inconsistencies in the implementation of derogation rights. Assuming that 
rights to opt out legitimately accompany RE courses, should similar rights not also attach to 
other courses? Where these “purely secular” courses teach ethics and morality or take for 
granted that students will engage in behaviour, such as sexual relationships outside of marriage, 
to which some religious persons might object, it is not clear why pupils’ and parents’ freedom 
of conscience should suddenly be brushed aside. The distinction between RE courses and ethics 
courses rests on a debatable confusion between secularity and neutrality. Such distinction is 
not only contradictory – as it goes back on the secular nature attributed to RE courses in the 
first place, it is also hard to square with liberalism itself, and notably the underlying requisite 
that the State should not take side on moral issues (Dworkin). If a distinction is to be drawn 
between courses, I would therefore argue that a more convincing dividing line would be 
between ethic-related subjects and others. Naturally, all subjects, whether directly related to 
morality and ethics questions or not, are never completely neutral. However, a line can be 
drawn.  
Take, for example, biology classes. From a neutrality perspective, one might say 
Darwinian theories on evolution are but one outlook on the world and that respect for religious 
beliefs in God’s creation requires according rights to opt out from biology classes as much as 
from ethics classes. However, such reasoning overlooks that evolutionary theories do not 
feature in biology classes as one conception on the world but as a scientific explanation of 
human beginnings. For sure, such scientific explanation might conflict with religious accounts 
in Genesis. Such potential conflicts between scientific explanations and religious convictions 
could even apply beyond the creationist debate. Indeed, any aspect of the science curriculum 
could conflict with someone’s religious views and be characterized by such person as “just one 
view” or “just a theory.” More fundamentally, the implicit strict divide between science and 
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religion is itself a partial view of the world. But this partiality of science does not invalidate 
Darwinian theories within the scientific framework. Teaching evolution in biology classes 
consists of teaching within such a scientific framework. It does not per se teach that the 
scientific framework is the only valid way of looking at the world.  
Two questions then arise. One is whether Creationist theories or their spin-offs, 
intelligent design (ID) theories,xxxii might have a place within this scientific framework. The 
other is whether the school system should grant rights to opt out to religious parents and pupils 
who object to the scientific framework itself. On the first point, Thomas Nagel (2008) put 
forward a powerful argument in support of including ID theories within biology classes. 
According to Nagel, exclusion of ID theories from science classes does not rely on scientific 
evidence but on the unproven opinion, shared by scientists, that supernatural intervention is 
impossible. Nagel makes a valid point but, in my view, he shifts the question at stake. Unproven 
assumptions about the lack of supernatural intervention reveal the lack of neutrality of the 
scientific framework but they tell us nothing about the scientific credentials of ID theories. The 
fact that ID theories cannot be labelled as “non-scientific” (Nagel 2012) does not imply that 
they can be labelled as scientific theories either. Nagel’s objection is illuminating as to the 
scientific framework itself but does not help devising the content of science programmes. 
Requiring scientific proof of the impossibility of a given theory, as Nagel suggests, is too high 
a burden for science and a too broad-encompassing selection criterion for devising science 
syllabi. Naturally, until proven otherwise, ID theories might have scientific validity but without 
elements pointing in that direction, this possibility cannot justify their inclusion in the science 
school syllabus. Otherwise, biology classes might just as well include any possible views of 
the world. Admittedly, ID theories are not any view but views supported by a large body of 
religious scholars; notwithstanding their religious, historical and sociological strong backing, 
they still lack positive scientific evidence of their credibility and have therefore according to 
me no place at all in biology classes. Since this justification relies on scientific premise (the 
need for positive scientific evidence), it will not be acceptable to pupils and parents who adopt 
a different framework. 
 The second point concerns whether parents and pupils should be allowed to opt out 
from biology classes or other scientific subjects if they see school imposition of the scientific 
frame of mind as violating their freedom of conscience. Three sets of interrelated interests push 
against such rights of exemption: a state interest in forming engaged citizens; individuals’ 
interest in an exposure to diversity and children’s pedagogical interests. The State has a 
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legitimate and weighty interest in requiring pupils to learn core academic subjects—namely, to 
ensure they develop the knowledge and skills necessary to full participation in democratic 
society and to enjoyment of educational, professional, and social opportunities (Feinberg). 
These courses are not value-free, but non-neutrality might be justified. Neutrality is not the 
defining feature of the liberal State. The State has thus no duty to ensure equal weight and 
representation for each system of beliefs in the school syllabus (should such even-handedness 
be possible). The State is free to privilege courses, which promote the above stated aims of 
democratic participation and social opportunities, even if it undermines certain ways of life. 
From the perspective of pupils and their parents, it follows that there is no right on their part to 
have their views reflected in the school syllabus whether positively or negatively (through 
rights of opt out). If rights of exemption were granted so extensively, rights to religious freedom 
would in effect allow pupils and their parents to expunge from the syllabus views they find 
offensive.xxxiii In a liberal State, citizens might reasonably be expected to accept exposure to 
beliefs and conceptions with which they disagree (Ackerman). In our multicultural societies, 
all citizens, whatever their creeds, will come across views and manifestations they object to. 
The core of liberal democracy is that all citizens need to accept this underlying diversity in 
order to construct fair terms of social cooperation (Rawls). Moreover, and more importantly 
for our present purposes, the pedagogical interests of children in receiving sound science 
training justify conferring lesser weight to religious beliefs at school than in other contexts. 
The crux of the argument therefore is not that science is superior to religion, but that children 
have an educational interest in receiving science classes, in order to preserve their educational, 
professional and social opportunities (Feinberg). The three interrelated sets of interests 
identified above to justify mandatory secular courses in state schools, namely a state interest in 
forming engaged citizens; individuals’ interest in an exposure to diversity and children’s 
pedagogical interests arguably apply equally to private schools and home schooling. However 
too great a degree of state control in the context of private and home teaching might undermine 
the very rationale for the existence of private and home schooling: the recognition that religious 
parents and religious communities should enjoy a sphere of autonomy. Leaving however this 
broader and complex debate aside, the demonstration above has focused on exemption requests 
in state schools.  
Unlike the abovementioned requests for exemption from courses, religious freedom 
claims relating to religious symbols seem to raise fewer concerns. Requests to wear particular 
religious symbols in derogation of school or state policies would not hinder children’s 
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participation in school activities but, at most, only alter the way they take part. Nevertheless, 
some requests to wear religious symbol have clashed with state interests and interfered with 
children’s participation in educational activities. 
 
 
PART III STATE SCHOOL CHILDREN AND RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS  
 
Accommodating religious symbol requests will usually be less burdensome for schools. They 
need not arrange alternative activities, modify assessment, or alter syllabi. Religious symbol 
cases are also less likely to raise constitutional objections. Display of majority religious 
symbols in state schools has given rise to constitutional challenges by atheist pupils (and their 
parents), but on the ground that this constituted state proselytizing, a concern to which religious 
symbols worn by a few pupils should rarely give rise.  
 
Requests not to be exposed to state-endorsed religious symbols 
In Lautsi v. Italy,xxxiv the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR held that the mandatory presence of 
crucifixes on the classroom walls of Italian state schools did not infringe convention rights and, 
in particular, did not violate children’s religious freedom rights (which include rights to 
freedom from religion) under article 9 ECHR. By contrast, the Second Chamberxxxv had held 
in November 2009 that the crucifix was incompatible with the state’s duty of neutrality in the 
exercise of public services, particularly in the field of education, and therefore violated Article 
2 of the First Protocol (the rights of parents to ensure that state education is in accordance their 
religious and philosophical convictions), taken in conjunction with Article 9. According to the 
Chamber’s reasoning, the presence of the crucifix could amount to state indoctrination. Given 
the impressionable age of the children, it could have a coercive impact (Mawhinney). It would 
also appear contrary to the neutrality of the liberal State (Temperman) and the respect owed to 
minority religious communities and believers in multicultural societies (Mancini & Rosenfeld).  
To its credit, the Grand Chamber showed greater restraint (Weiler). Its emphasis on the 
State’s margin of appreciation signals that unless complainants establish concrete violations of 
convention rights, the Court will not interfere with state practice. Such caution is in my view 
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welcome. Otherwise, the ECtHR would indirectly be imposing a separatist model of 
Church/State relationships and hereby encroach on matters within Member States’ margin of 
appreciation (Evans). The Grand Chamber’s decision in Lautsi can therefore rely on 
constitutional considerations of States’ sovereignty. The Grand Chamber Lautsi decision can 
also be justified in substantive terms. It might be too crude to conclude that any and all religious 
symbols in state schools – even symbols of the majority faith– necessarily generate an 
expressive harm on minority religion members and on citizens without any religion (Eisgruber 
& Sager). The inherent multiplicity and complexity of meanings carried by symbols should 
lead to a wider and more complex assessment of the effects of symbols on a given audience.xxxvi 
The overall attitude of the particular school towards religion and towards pupils with non-
majority beliefs should feature in the assessment of the impact the crucifix might have (Contra 
Kyritsis and Tsakyrakis). In Lautsi, the Grand Chamber observed that in the school in question: 
“Islamic headscarves were permitted, the commencement and end of Ramadan was often marked 
in school and Jewish pupils were entitled to sit examinations on days other than Saturdays” (paras 
74 and 39). One might therefore conclude that the school’s overall benevolent attitude towards 
all religions balanced out the emphasis given to Catholicism and Christianity through the 
display of crucifixes in classroom walls. Admittedly, such contextual analysis will be of no 
comfort for those pupils who, like the claimants, consider the presence of the crucifix offensive 
and violating their freedom of conscience. And if mere discussion of religion is enough to 
justify rights to opt out from neutral RE courses, it seems inconsistent to suggest pupils may 
be forced to study under the cross.xxxvii  
By definition, symbols have open-ended and ambiguous meanings. One way to resolve 
this inherent ambiguity of meaning would be to adopt a subjective test whereby the courts 
would defer to the claimant’s sincerely-held perceptions of the symbol’s message. However, 
such test would be tantamount to leaving to the claimant not only the issue of whether the 
contested symbol interferes with his/her convictionsxxxviii but also the issue of whether the 
interference is justified. In my view, the issue of justification – which entails the balancing of 
competing interests – is best left to the State and the courts. A naked space is no more neutral 
than one displaying majority religious symbols. Only contextual concrete evaluations of rights’ 
violations can therefore determine whether one is more justified than the other against a 
particular religious freedom claim and such assessment is best carried out democratically 
through the deliberative process of judicial reasoning rather than left for the aggrieved to decide 
unilaterally. Judges cannot discredit the wishes of the majority simply because they are those 
of the majority.xxxix This does not preclude the State or national courts interpreting relevant 
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constitutional national provisions to embrace a strict conception of state neutrality and hold 
that religious symbols should never feature in state school classrooms. However, failing such 
national constitutional rulings, the ECtHR was correct to adopt a cautious and contextual 
approach to the issue and to resist enforcing a strict model of neutrality across Europe.xl 
Likewise, courts should resist the temptation to ascribe unilateral meanings to religious 
symbols worn by pupils. 
 
Requests to wear religious symbols 
In the leading English case of Begum,xli  a secondary school girl challenged the decision by the 
head teacher and governors of Denbigh High School to exclude her for wearing religious attire, 
on the ground that it violated her right to religious freedom under article 9 ECHR. Under school 
policy, three uniform options were available to students. The least revealing was the shalwar 
kameeze, consisting of wide trousers underneath a tunic. The school selected that as an option, 
following extensive consultation with local religious communities, because it could be worn 
by Muslim, Hindu and Sikh girls alike and therefore minimized religious differentiation within 
the school. Miss Begum requested the right to wear a jilhab instead– a long and loose-fit coat 
garment which covers the entire body but leaves the hands and face visible. She claimed that 
the shalwat kameez did not comply with the requirements of Islam as it did not effectively 
conceal the shape of her body. The school denied her request. The House of Lords (now 
Supreme Court) ruled in favour of the school. First, it noted with approbation the extensive 
consultation with religious local communities which had preceded the drafting of the school 
uniform policy.xlii Secondly, it downplayed the pupil’s religious freedom claim by pointing to 
inconsistencies in her behaviour --she had for two years agreed to abide by the school uniform 
rules without any complaints—and noted the possibility that she had been coerced to change 
her view,xliii  as her brother had recently converted to fundamentalist Islamist ideas.xliv In 
addition, the Court expressed concern that allowing her to wear the jilhab might trigger 
pressure on her peers also to adopt a stricter form of dress. In the end, therefore, the House of 
Lords held the interference with her right to religious freedom to be proportionate and justified. 
From a children’s right perspective, the Begum decision is deficient because the court ignored 
the student’s point of view.xlv More generally, the lack of evidence to support the suggestions 
of coercion or proselytism leaves the impression that the court will systematically dismiss 
pupils’ individual religious beliefs when they clash with school policies that are well accepted 
by the local community and the majority of students.  
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I suggest, like Freeman (2011) and Malik (2008), that pupils’ religious freedom 
requests carry more weight in these instances and that only empirically robust objections might 
justify the interference with their rights. Whilst abstract notions of social cohesion should not 
be enough to outweigh pupils’ religious freedom requests, concrete concerns for pupils’ 
educational rights and opportunities might still legitimately trump respect for their beliefs. For 
example, when a pupil requests to wear a full burqa or niqab – a full-covering garment, which 
covers the body as well as the face– the school may validly raise concerns about the resulting 
diminished quality of the education which the veiled student would receive.xlvi Teachers check, 
through their students’ facial expressions, whether pupils follow class discussions. Wearing a 
face-covering garment could arguably prevent the teacher from spotting any of these clues. An 
underlying issue in these debates relates to whether the onus is on the school to make efforts to 
integrate the religious pupils or on the religious pupil to strive to participate in school life. In 
Begum, the school pupil raised a challenge against the school’s decision to exclude her. In 
response, the school argued that their decision was the result of Miss Begum’s own intransigent 
decision to exclude herself despite a carefully crafted and well-balanced policy. Similarly in 
the hypothetic burqa case above, one could argue either that the student is retreating from class 
participation by veiling herself so completely or that the school is pushing the student away 
from school altogether by denying her request. Unless constitutional principles impede any 
accommodation efforts, the ECtHR now seems to require the search for a compromise between 
the school and the individual pupil concerned. In Osmanoğlu & Kocabaş v. Switzerland for 
example,xlvii the ECtHR held that compulsory mixed swimming classes did not infringe any 
convention rights but not before having approvingly noted that the school authorities had 
sought to accommodate the student’s beliefs by allowing her to wear a burkini– a swimsuit 
which covers the entire body except for the face. Arguably, it is because the school had 
accommodated prior religious clothing requests that the ECtHR held that the subsequent denial 
of the course exemption request was legitimate and proportionate. This reasoning also avoided 
dealing head-on with the issue of the underlying conflict between religious freedom and gender 
equality rights.xlviii  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As in all religious freedom cases, legal solutions pertaining to state school children’s religious 
freedoms vary depending on the underlying constitutional legal framework. Most legal systems 
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will not rule out children’s religious expression at school in principle. Whether children’s 
religious freedom claims manifest themselves negatively – through an exemption request– or 
positively, through the wearing of religious clothing, school authorities will generally 
acknowledge the conflict with children’s (and their parents’) convictions. Such benevolent 
starting point seems less obviously appropriate for course exemption requests directed at 
“purely secular” courses. This chapter has argued that the current distinction between courses 
on religion and others is not satisfactory. A more convincing solution would be either to deny 
any exemption from courses, even RE courses, which do not have a religious purpose or nature 
or draw a different distinction. Should exemption rights be granted from some courses, a more 
convincing distinction would be between courses dealing with morality, ethics, and religion 
and other courses, as it would match liberalism’s premise that the State should not take side on 
moral issues as well as bolster children’s educational opportunities. Undeniably, this pro-
participatory interpretation of children’s education rights is itself a moral position but one 
which fits with liberalism’s emphasis on engaged citizens and with a forward-looking 
construction of children’s welfare as a right to an open future. In children’s religious freedom 
cases involving the presence of religious symbols at school, legal solutions, albeit generally 
welcoming towards religious symbols worn by students, often revolve on abstract conceptions 
of the meanings and effects of particular symbols. By contrast, this chapter has argued that a 
more contextual and nuanced approach should be adopted. More broadly, whereas the law 
currently tends to confuse notions of neutrality and secularity and construe religious claims as 
private issues of conscience, my line of argumentation puts more emphasis on the value of 
inclusive participation and of religious freedoms as a positive contribution to such 
participation. Religious freedoms should not only be a matter of conscience, of individual 
identity, but also a positive social good that fosters richer and more inclusive interactions.  
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i Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (GA Res 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948) 
provides that everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. See also article 18(1) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Article 9(1) European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR); article 10 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the EU Charter). The 
United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on 
Religion and Belief– GA Res 36155 UN, GAOR, 36th Sess Supp No51, at 171, U.N. Doc A/36/55 (1981) also 
grants individuals the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. In the US, the right to religious belief is based 
on the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution (and the US Supreme Court decision in 
Cantwell v Connecticut 310 US 296, 304 (1940). 
ii  These conflicting interests will feature through the qualifications provided to the right to religious freedom. See 
article 29 of the Universal declaration; Article 18(3) of the ICCPR; Article 9(2) ECHR. The US SC has identified 
a number of implied limitations to religious practice “for the protection of society” Cantwell v Connecticut 310 
US 296, 304 (1940). 
iii  Pierce v Society of Sisters 268 US 510 (1925); In the UK, state schools may also have a religious denomination 
(Hunter-Henin 2018; Rivers). 
iv Re G (Education: Religious Upbringing) [2012] EWCA Civ 1233; [2002] 3 FCR 524. 
v Wisconsin v Yoder 406 US 205, 220 (1972). 
vi See however, infra, the independent rights to opt out granted to pupils in England and Wales once they reach 
the last two years of schooling. 
vii See, for example, article 2 Protocol I of the ECHR; Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 
articles 13 and 14 ICCPR; article 1 of the 1960 UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education; the 
1981; article 10 of the European Charter. 
viii Crockett v Sorenson, 568 F Supp 1422 (1983). 
ix ECtHR 26th November 2015 Ebrahimian v France, App. no 64846/11.x Cf. underlying the risks of 
indoctrination, ECtHR 15 February 2011 Dahlab v Switzerland, App. no 42393/98. 
xi Loi n. 2004-228 of 15 March 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues 
manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, colleges, lycées publics, JO 17 March 2004, 5190 (Act 
regulating, by virtue of the principle of “laïcité”, the wearing of religious symbols or clothing in state primary and 
secondary schools).   
xii Conseil d’Etat 27 November 1989 Avis, RFDA (1990), 1. 
xiii See, for example, Loi n. 2010-1192 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public of 11 October 
2010, JO 12 October 2010 (known as the burqa ban). Adde, extending obligations of religious neutrality upon a 
mother taking part in a school visit, TA Montreuil 22 November 2011, Droit Administratif (2012), 163; for the 
extension of religious neutrality duties in the workplace, see Loi n. 2016-1088 du 8 août 2016 relative au travail, 
à la modernisation du dialogue social et à la sécurisation des parcours professionnels, JO n°0184, 9 August 2016.  
xiv The reasoning explains that the 2004 Law does not apply to universities or to private schools. 
xv  See, however, upholding the 2004 Law, ECtHR 30 June 2009 Bayrak v. France, App. no. 14308/08, but the 
decision mainly relies on the wide margin of appreciation granted to Member States in the interpretation of their 
constitutional Church/State arrangement principles. 
xvi Contra, arguing that a religious upbringing need not hamper critical and autonomous thought (Adhar). 
xvii The US Supreme Court explicitly stated that it is permissible to discuss religion in the classroom, Abingdon 
Township v Schempp 374 US 203 (1963). 
xviii Under the Lemon test, Lemon v Kurzman 403 US 602 (1971), which also requires the State to prove that the 
contested activity does not result in the advancement or restriction of religion and that the activity does not foster 
an excessive entanglement with religion. 
xix Wallace v Jaffree 472 US 38 (1985). For an illustration of the endorsement test, see Tammy Kizmiller v Dover 
Area School District 400F Supp 2nd 707 (MD Pa 2005). 
xx Abingdon Township v Schempp 374 US 203 (1963). 
xxi Engel v Vitale 370 US 421 (1962). The prohibition will extend to meditation or voluntary prayer as the purpose 
would still be to endorse religion by encouraging prayer, Wallace v Jaffree 472 US 38 (1985). 
xxii School Standards and Framework Act 1998 Sch 20, para 3. 
xxiii See taking that view, Wiley v Franklin 468 F Supp 133 (ED Tenn 1979). 
xxiv op. cit. 
xxv ECtHR 29 June 2007 Folgerø and others v. Norway Grand Chamber, App. no. 15472/02, § 89. 
xxvi Education Act 1996 Part V, Chapter 3, s 389 and School Standards and Framework Act 1998 s 71. 
xxvii  School Standards and Framework Act 1998 s 71(1). 
xxviii  School Standards and Framework Act 1998 s 71(1B), inserted by the Education and Inspections Act 2006. 
xxix  Ibid, Sched 20, s.3. 
xxx ECtHR 6 October 2009 Appel-Irrgang & Ors v Germany, App. no. 45216/07. 
                                                          
16 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
xxxi ECtHR 13 September 2011 Dojan v. Germany, App. no. 319/08 and recently, ECtHR 18 January 2018 A.R. & 
L.R. v. Switzerland, App. No. 22338/15 (decisions on admissibility). 
xxxii ECtHR Osmanoğlu & Kocabaş v. Switzerland 10 January 2017, App. No. 29086/12. 
xxxiii Intelligent design theories are less obviously religious as they do not refer to the book of Genesis but, like 
Creationist theories, they explain the beginnings of the world by reference to supernatural intervention.  
xxxiv Identical arguments could be put forward to justify the mandatory nature of RE courses. However the fact 
that religion is the subject-matter of the course makes it more sensitive and could therefore justify maintaining 
exemptions from RE courses only. 
xxxv ECtHR 18 March 2011 Lautsi and Others v Italy Grand Chamber, App. no. 30814/06.   
xxxvi ECtHR 3 November 2009 Lautsi and Others v Italy Second Chamber, App. no. 30814/06. 
xxxvii  For such a nuanced contextual interpretation, but outside the school context, see US SC Lynch v Donnelly 
465 US 668 (1984) (government-sponsored display of nativity scene) and County of Allegheny v ACLU 492 US 
573 (1989) (government-sponsored display of menorah). 
xxxviii I have argued above however that mandatory neutral RE courses could be compatible with liberalism. 
xxxix  UNDELETE 
xl Grand Chamber judgment, Lautsi, op. cit., Concurring Opinion of Judge Bonello at para. 3.5 to 3.16. 
xli UNDELETExli The ECtHR has recognized the legitimacy of a diversity of ‘church–state’ relationships across 
Europe. See for example, ECtHR 9 July 2013 Sindicatul “Păstorul cel bun” v. Romania Grand Chamber, App. 
no. 2330/09, para. 38. 
xlii R (Begum) v Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15.   
xliii  ibid, para 7.  
xliv ibid, para 45. 
xlv ibid, para 80. 
xlvi See however, Baroness Hale’s judgment, notably, para. 96.   
xlvii For such concerns, but in relation to a teaching-assistant, the English case Azmir v Kirklees Metropolitan 
Borough Council [2007] ICR 1154. 
xlviii  op. cit. 
xlix For an illustration of such conflict in a state school (with a religious Muslim ethos), see the English case Al-
Hirjah school case [2017] EWCA Civ 1426. 
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